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We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining in the presence of random arbitration. Two 
players make simultaneous demands; if compatible, each receives the amount demanded as in the 
standard Nash demand game. If bargainers’ demands are incompatible, then rather than bargainers 
receiving their disagreement payoffs with certainty, they receive them only with exogenous 
probability 1−q. With probability q, there is random arbitration instead, with one bargainer 
randomly selected to receive his/her demand and the other bargainer receiving the remainder. The 
bargaining set is asymmetric, with one bargainer favoured over the other. We set disagreement 
payoffs to zero, and vary q over several values ranging from zero to one. 
Our main experimental results support the directional predictions of standard game theory (though 
the success of its point predictions is mixed). In the spirit of typical results for conventional 
arbitration, we observe a strong chilling effect on bargaining for values of q near one, with extreme 
demands and low agreement rates in these treatments. For the most part, increases in q reinforce the 
built-in asymmetry of the game, further benefiting the favoured player at the expense of the 
unfavoured player. The effects we find are non-uniform in q: over some fairly large ranges, 
increases in q have minimal effect on bargaining outcomes, but for other values of q, a small 
additional increase in q leads to sharp changes in results. 
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 1 Introduction
Many economic transactions involve a decentralised element, with the price (and perhaps other attributes) set by a
single buyer and a single seller, each with some degree of market power. Well–known examples of at least partly
decentralised markets include those for houses, new cars and used cars in most countries, as well as labour markets
in many professions. In such a market, associated with any potential transaction is a relation–speciﬁc surplus for
the parties involved: for example, if a painting is worth $50,000 to its current owner and $80,000 to a potential
buyer, then a surplus of $30,000 is available to the two parties. The fundamental role of bargaining in determining
how surpluses are divided (and indeed, whether they are even realised) in decentralised markets has long been
recognised, with work in this area going back at least to the late nineteenth century (Edgeworth, 1881). However,
until the 1950s, bilateral bargaining situations were deemed by economists to lack a clear predicted outcome.1 The
only quasi–prediction was that the division of the surplus would depend on the two parties’ relative bargaining
power.
Nash (1950) approached this indeterminacy problem by proposing a set of four axioms that the outcome of
bargaining ought to follow, and proving that together, these axioms entail a unique solution to any bargaining sit-
uation that satisﬁes a few weak conditions, giving rise to the Nash bargaining solution.2 Nash (1953) followed
up this axiomatic approach by introducing a very simple non–cooperative game, now known as the Nash Demand
Game (which we abbreviate as NDG). In the simplest version of the NDG, there is a ﬁxed sum of money (a “cake”)
available to the two bargainers, each of whom simultaneously makes a single, irrevocable demand. If the demands
are compatible (that is, their sum does not exceed the size of the cake), then there is “agreement”, and each bar-
gainer receives the amount he/she demanded. If not, then a predetermined “disagreement” outcome is imposed.
By introducing the NDG, which was meant to capture the key aspects of real bargaining, Nash established a new
research agenda, now called the“Nash program” (Binmore, 1998). This program uses non–cooperativegame theory
to provide a foundation for axiomatic (cooperative) bargaining solution concepts like the Nash solution.
The simplicity of the Nash Demand Game is a great virtue, but as a model of real bargaining it has two major
disadvantages: one theoretical and one practical. Its theoretical disadvantage is that most versions of the NDG
have a large number of Nash equilibria. In particular, every efﬁcient, individually rational division of the surplus
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. (There are also inefﬁcient Nash equilibria.) This multiplicityof equilibria– and
resulting lack of predictive power – clearly limits the usefulness of the NDG for analysing real bargaining.
Thepractical shortcomingoftheNDG concernsthecaseofincompatibledemands. Inthiscase, thedisagreement
outcome is imposed, resulting in a severe punishment to the bargainers, with no chance of avoiding it through
renegotiation. The fact that failure to agree immediately leads to irrevocable disagreement (irrespective of how
close to being compatible the two demands were) ﬂies in the face of most people’s intuitive understanding of how
bargaining works. Despite this seeming deﬁciency, some researchers have defended the NDG as a model of real
bargaining. Binmore (2007) points out that when bargainers can commit to demands, but neither has the ability
to commit before the other, the NDG is the limiting case where both bargainers “rush to get a take–it–or–leave–it
demand on the tableﬁrst” (p. 496), resultingin simultaneousirrevocable demands. Moreover, Skyrms (1996)argues
1For example,asRoth (1979) pointsout, von NeumannandMorgenstern’s(1944) bargainingsolutioncoincideswith theset of all efﬁcient
outcomes that both bargainers prefer to disagreement.
2Formally, a two–person bargaining problem is described by a pair (S,d) where S ⊂ R
2 is the set of feasible agreements with a
disagreement point d = (d1,d2) ∈ S being the allocation that results if no agreement is reached. Nash’s solution requires only that S is
compact and convex, and that it contains some (x1,x2) with x1 > d1 and x2 > d2 (that is, gains from agreement are available); these
conditions will be satisﬁed for the bargaining problems considered in this paper.
1that in modelling the bargaining process, “[o]ne might imagine some initial haggling...but in the end each of us has
a bottom line” (p. 4); focussing on these bottom lines results in the NDG. However, experimental evidence suggests
that there are indeed systematic differences in behaviour between the NDG and less structured bargaining settings –
both in the likelihoodof reaching agreement and in how theresultingsurplus is divided(Feltovich and Swierzbinski,
2011) – suggesting that some important features of real bargaining are lost by modelling it with the NDG.
Nash (1953) himself provided the ﬁrst attempt to rectify these problems, with g a “smoothing”approach. Under
smoothing, incompatible pairs of demands do not necessarily lead to zero payoffs; rather, the probability of a pair
of demands being accepted decreases continuouslyfrom one (at the boundary of the original bargaining set) to zero
based on a smoothing function.3 Clearly, such a modiﬁcation treats incompatible demands differently according
to how close to being compatible they were. Less obviously, when an appropriate smoothing function is used, it
results in the set of Nash equilibriashrinkingto a uniqueequilibriumcorrespondingto the Nash bargaining solution.
Although this smoothing attempt was the ﬁrst to provide non–cooperative foundations for the Nash solution, it has
typically not been deemed reasonable by game theorists since that time.4
A morerecent attempt isthat by Anbarciand Boyd (2011),whose“probabilisticsimultaneousprocedure”(p. 18)
modiﬁed theNDG so that bargainers submittingincompatibledemands do notnecessarily receive theirdisagreement
payoffs; instead, with probability q ∈ [0,1], a fair coin toss determines which of the two bargainers receives his/her
demand (with the remainder going to the other bargainer). Only with probability 1 − q does disagreement actually
lead to imposition of the disagreement outcome. Anbarci and Boyd’s game can be thought of as combining the
standard NDG with an element of arbitration. In the case of incompatibledemands, withprobabilityq the bargainers
undergo ﬁnal–offer arbitration, using the bargainers’ ﬁnal offers as their demands. Unlike many models of ﬁnal–
offer arbitration, the arbitrator does not have a preferred outcome with which to compare the demands to arrive at
a decision, and simply chooses either of the demands with equal probability. We will refer to this class of games
as “Nash demand games with random arbitration”. The parameter q (the probability of random arbitration in the
case of disagreement) admits several interpretations. In an abstract vein, it serves to relate standard Nash bargaining
without arbitration (the case where q = 0) to standard ﬁnal–offer arbitration without bargaining (where q = 1),
and to highlight a connection between their theoretical implications. In a more concrete vein, one could consider
imposition of the disagreement outcome with probability 1 − q as reﬂecting a possibility that subsequent external
events make arbitration impossible.
Anbarci and Boyd (2011) were primarily concerned with the set of equilibria in which players agree (i.e., their
demands are compatible, so the arbitration stage is not reached), and in particular how this set relates to the pre-
dictions of some of the well–known axiomatic bargaining solutions. However, their game, which we will often
abbreviate as NDG(q), has an additional property that makes it interesting from a theoretical standpoint: as q in-
creases, the set of Nash equilibria changes in a manner that is monotonic in a sense, but not uniform. The speciﬁcs
of this will be discussed in some detail in Section 2, but intuitively, for some ranges of q, fairly large changes in q
will have littleor no effect on the set of equilibria, while for other ranges of q, the set of equilibriawill be extremely
sensitive to small changes in q.
The purpose of this paper is to put the theoretical implications of Anbarci and Boyd’s (2011) game to the test,
3See Binmore et al. (1993) for an experiment using a “smoothed”bargaining set.
4For example, Luce and Raiffa (1957) write that “Nash offers an ingenious and mathematically sound argument for [resolving the inde-
terminacy problem], but we fail to see why it is relevant” (p. 141) and go on to call smoothing “completely artiﬁcial” (p. 142). Schelling
(1960) was more sympathetic, but even so, stated that smoothing was “in no senselogically necessary”(p. 283) and that while it provided an
way of selecting one of the multiplicity of equilibria, the same argument “equally supports any other procedure that producesa candidatefor
election among the inﬁnitely many potential [solutions]” (p. 284).
2with the use of a human–subjects experiment. To our knowledge, there has been no previous experimental study of
this game, though of course both bargaining and arbitration have immense literatures.5 Our study begins with an
underlyingbargainingenvironment that is biased, in that one bargainer has a favourablepositionrelativeto the other.
Such asymmetry has two advantages from an experimental–design standpoint. First, it adds an element of genuine
strategic uncertainty to the game, since in asymmetric bargaining settings, there is no single obvious focal outcome
(in contrast to symmetric bargaining games, which are overwhelmingly likely to lead to equal splits). Second, it
opens the possibility of examining whether varying q affects the extent to which the favoured player is able (or
willing) to exploit this favourable position. Our experiment is designed to allow such an examination (among other
things), utilisingseveral values of q ranging from zero to one.
Our experimental results give positive, but not unequivocal, support to standard game theory. We ﬁnd that the
theory often performs poorly when faced with strong tests arisingfrom equilibriumpointpredictions; theseare often
not seen in the experimental data. However, qualitative implications of the theory, based on the directions of effects
on behaviour resulting from varying q, conform closely to what is seen in the experiment. In particular, compared
to lower values, higher values of q are more often associated with a “chilling effect” on bargaining (as is often seen
in models of conventional arbitration), with substantially lower agreement rates (e.g., less than 25% when q = 1, as
compared to over 90% when q = 0) resulting from extreme demands. This effect tends to reinforce the inherent bias
of the bargaining environment, increasing the payoffs of the favoured player at the expense of the unfavoured player
(in effect giving players nearly diametrically opposed preferences over q). Speciﬁcally, the ratio between favoured–
and unfavoured–playerpayoffs when q is low is close to that of the most equitable efﬁcient divisionof the cake (the
lexicographic egalitarian solution; see Chun, 1989), while when q is high, this ratio is comparable to that of the
more uneven Kalai–Smorodinsky (1975) outcome. Finally, we ﬁnd that consistent with the theory, increases in q
have non–uniform effects. For a fairly large range of q, increases in q have minimal effect on bargaining behaviour
and outcomes. From there, even a small additional increase in q can lead to sharp changes in results, while further
increases have littleeffect beyond this.
2 Theoretical background
The game used in the experiment is an adaptation of the Nash Demand Game (Nash, 1953), which we abbreviate
NDG. In the version we use, there is a ﬁxed surplus (“cake”) of £10 available to be divided by two bargainers. The
bargainers make simultaneousdemands; Player 1 (thefavoured player) can chooseany demand x1 between zero and
x1 = £9.50, while Player 2 (the unfavoured player) can choose any demand x2 between zero and x2 = £4.50. If the
demands are compatible(total £10 or less), there is “agreement”, and each bargainer receives the amount demanded,
with any remainder left “on the table”. In this basic game, if the demands are incompatible (“disagreement”), both
bargainers receive zero. In either case, the game ends with no opportunity for further negotiation. All rules of the
game, including the limits placed on demands, are assumed to be common knowledge between the players.
Under the assumption that bargainers’ payoffs are identical to their monetary payments, the bargaining problem
can be depicted in Figure 1. As noted already, setting the players’ maximum allowable demands to x1 = 9.50 and
x2 = 4.50 makes the bargaining problem asymmetric, decreasing the likelihood that the players will agree on a
single obvious focal point.6 Indeed, the most common focal point in bargaining games, a 50–50 split of the surplus,
5Surveys of bargaining experiments can be found in Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003, pp. 151–198). Surveys of experiments involving
bargaining with arbitration can be found in Kuhn (2009) and Charnessand Kuhn (2010).
6A typical result in experiments involving symmetric bargaininggamesis that they tend to yield a high frequencyof agreementson 50–50
3Figure 1: The bargaining problem – feasible set and disagreement outcome d



































































































































































is impossible in our game, and while other equal–payoff outcomes are possible (e.g., each player receives £4.50),
they are neither equilibria nor efﬁcient.
As is common in NDGs,this basic game has a large number of Nash equilibria. There are efﬁcient pure–strategy
equilibria in which Player 1 demands k and Player 2 demands 10 − k, for k ∈ [10 − x2,x1], as well as inefﬁcient
mixed–strategy equilibria. Ruling out any of these equilibria requires the use of additional assumptions; however,
we note that both Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) risk dominance and their general equilibrium selection procedure
select the most equitable of the efﬁcient equilibria (5.5, 4.5).7 This outcome is also implied by some of the well–
known axiomatic bargaining solutionsfor the corresponding unstructured bargaining game, such as the Nash (1950)
and lexicographic egalitarian (Chun, 1989) solutions (though not the Kalai–Smorodinsky (1975) solution, which
selects an agreement with Player 1 getting £6.784
7 of the £10).8 Additionally, while Rawls’s (1971) “difference
principle” did not deal with bargaining speciﬁcally, arguments in this spirit would select (5.5, 4.5) as the fairest
efﬁcient division of the cake (as it maximises the payoff of the worse–off player). Given that so many cooperative
and non–cooperativemethods select the (5.5, 4.5) outcome, we might expect it to serve as an appealing focal point.
splits of the cake. Introducing any kind of asymmetry substantially lowers both agreement frequenciesand equal splits, even when such play
is still consistentwith equilibrium, possiblydue to players’ self–serving views of fairness(Babcocket al., 1995, Roth and Murnighan, 1982).
See Nydeggerand Owen (1975) andRoth and Malouf (1979) for experimental comparisonsof symmetric andasymmetric bargaininggames.
7Risk dominance formalises the intuitive notion that when players have little information about the choices others will make, they will
prefer strategies that are (in some sense) less risky. In the simplest case of a symmetric 2x2 game with strategic complementarities and two
strict Nash equilibria (s,s) and (t,t), (s,s) is risk dominant if the threshold probability of the opponent choosing s at which s becomes a
best responseis lower than the corresponding threshold probability for t. Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) text extends this intuition for general
non–cooperativegames.
8The lexicographic egalitarian solution differs from the strict egalitarian solution in tolerating increases in inequity as long as they don’t
actually harm the worse–off player. For the bargaining set we use, the inefﬁcient outcome (4.5, 4.5) is the strict egalitarian solution; weak
Paretoimprovements from herearepossible,but beneﬁtPlayer1onlyandarethusruledoutbyastrict egalitarian. Bycontrast,alexicographic
egalitarian would allow any (weak or strong) Pareto improvements, and would thus select (5.5, 4.5) for our bargaining set.
42.1 The Nash demand game with random arbitration
From the basic NDG, we make one modiﬁcation: in case of incompatible demands, the players might still do better
than receivingtheirdisagreement payoffs ofzero. Speciﬁcally, with (common knowledge)probabilityq ∈ [0,1],one
of the players is randomly selected – with either equally likely – to receive the amount he/she demanded, with the
other player receiving the remainder of the cake. With probability1 − q, both players receive zero, as before. Thus,
when q = 0, demands must be compatiblein orderfor theplayers to get any positivepayoffs, whileas q increases, so
increases the likelihoodthat players get signiﬁcant payoffs without an agreement. We will use the notation NDG(q)
to refer to a generic version of this game, so that NDG(0) is equivalent to the basic Nash demand game.
Obviously, our NDG(q) is much simpler than actual situations involving bargaining and arbitration. However,
some real–world settings do have the ﬂavour of this game, especially regarding the uncertainty of whether an ar-
bitration phase will follow a disagreement. In many international political and commercial disputes, arbitration is
neither automatic nor automatically ruled out. For example, two conﬂicting states may hope that the United Nations
will provide arbitration if the conﬂict escalates out of control, but the UN may be reluctant to do so for various
reasons; if there is uncertainty about whether the UN actually does arbitrate, the resultingsituation is very much like
our NDG(q) (where q is the probability that arbitration takes place). Likewise,in internationalcommercial disputes,
there can be conditions before authorised bodies would be able to provide arbitration.9
2.2 Theoretical predictions
As noted in the introduction, this modiﬁcation to the game can be interpreted as (with probability q) tacking on a
stage of ﬁnal–offer arbitration, where the “ﬁnal offers” are simply the players’ demands, and the arbitrator chooses
either demand with equal probability. It is worth pointing out that this arbitration rule differs in an important way
from those in typical models of ﬁnal–offer arbitration, where the likelihood of a player’s offer being the one chosen
is negatively related to its distance from some “ideal point” held by the arbitrator, thus punishing extreme demands
to some extent. The arbitration rule in NDG(q) is not sensitive to the speciﬁc demands chosen by the players,
and can thus be thought of as a stochastic version of conventional arbitration (conditional on arbitration occurring,
in expected value terms it chooses an outcome midway between the bargainers’ demands, as a simple model of
conventional arbitration might). In particular, for q close to one, predicted behaviour is the typical “chilling effect”
seen in models ofconventionalarbitration,whereboth playerschoosethemaximumdemand they are abletomake.10
As long as q is strictly less than one, this equilibrium is inefﬁcient, and indeed, Pareto dominated by som non–
equilibriumstrategy proﬁles that lead to agreement.
Thus, when q = 0, NDG(q) has the usual problem of multiplicity of Nash equilibria, while when q = 1, the
only equilibrium involves the chilling effect just described. However, for some q ∈ (0,1), the game’s theoretical
prediction can be precise as well as avoiding the most extreme demands, as the analysis below will show.
9Ryan (1999) provides such a real–life example in the context of international commercial disputes: “Chapter 2 of Title 9 of the United
States Code contains the New York Convention and the enabling legislation by which it was ratiﬁed by the United States in 1970...The Con-
vention contemplates a limited inquiry by courts when considering a motion to compel arbitration: 1. Is there an agreement in writing to
arbitrate the dispute? 2. Does the agreement provide for arbitration in the territory of a Convention signatory? 3. Does the agreement to
arbitrate arise out of a commercial legal relationship? 4. Is a party to the agreement not an American citizen or does the commercial rela-
tionship have some reasonablerelation with one or more Foreign States?” The third and fourth of thesecriteria, relying on the interpretations
of “commercial legal rationship” and “reasonable relation”, may in some cases be ambiguous enough to permit real uncertainty regarding
whether arbitration will be compelled; if so, the situation could be modelled using our NDG(q).
10The chilling effect that conventional arbitration, and to a lesser extent ﬁnal–offer arbitration, can have on bargaining is well covered in
the theoretical and empirical literature. See, for example, Feuille (1975).
5Clearly, for any allowable demand x3−i by the opponent (i = 1,2), Player i’s best response will be either the
highest compatible demand xi = 10−x3−i or the maximum possibledemand xi = xi. Choosing xi is best if either
(a)x3−i is lowenoughthatagreement isreached even whenxi ischosen,or(b)q ishighenoughthat the
q
2 probability
of being selected to get xi is worth the risk of disagreement (noting that the player still gets 10 − x3−i in the event
that the arbitrator selects the opponent’s demand). This leads to the possibility of two types of pure–strategy Nash
equilibrium. The ﬁrst type,which correspondsto theefﬁcient equilibriaof thestandard NDG, has x1+x2 = 10, and
agreement occurs with probability one. The second type of equilibrium has both players choosing their maximum





We will sometimes refer to these two types of equilibrium as “agreement equilibria” and “chilling effect equilibria”
respectively.
Which of these types of equilibria exists depends on q; as q increases, a choice of the maximum allowable
demand becomes more proﬁtable relative to lower demands that might lead to agreement; more precisely, a demand
of xi strictly dominates demands below
q
2−qxi. So, as a function of q, the favoured player’s minimum demand in






, while her maximum demand in an agreement equilibrium is 9.5







whilehis maximum demand in an agreement equilibriumis 4.5 for all q. As a result,as q increases, thecontinuumof

































agreement equilibriaseen in thebasicNDG shrinks,becoming asinglepointwhen q = 5
6 ≈ 0.833,withthefavoured
player receiving 19
28 ≈ 0.679 of the cake.11 Beyond this value of q, only the “chilling effect” equilibrium exists; the
favoured player demands 9.5 and the unfavoured player demands 4.5, implying expected payoffs of 7.5q and 2.5q
respectively. Chilling effect equilibriaalso exist for some lower values of q: speciﬁcally, whenever q ≥ 11
15 ≈ 0.733.
Except when q = 1, these chilling effect equilibria are inefﬁcient, and indeed are payoff dominated by outcomes in






, these latter outcomes may be equilibria themselves,
11The unique Nash equilibrium outcome for this value of q coincides with the Kalai–Smorodinsky (1975) solution for the corresponding
unstructured bargaining problem. As Anbarci and Boyd (2011) show, this is true for any bargaining set satisfying minimal properties.
6but for higher q, they are necessarily non–equilibriumoutcomes (in which case the game has some characteristics of
the prisoners’ dilemma).
Figure 2 shows the correspondence between the value of q and the set of Nash equilibria for NDG(q). As the
ﬁgure shows, there is an element of monotonicityto the correspondence: for q1 < q2, the set of agreement equilibria
of NDG(q1) contains the corresponding set for NDG(q2), and once we reach a value of q for which a chilling–
effect equilibrium exists, it continues to exist for all higher q. However, the correspondence is not uniform. For
q ∈ [0,0.2], the set of equilibria is exactly the same as it is for the basic Nash demand game, and for q from 0.2 all
theway up to 11
15, theset of agreement equilibriashrinksat a fairly constantrate, as relativelyasymmetric agreements
become worsefor the unfavoured player than demanding his maximum; in particular, the risk–dominantequilibrium
(5.50, 4.50) of the basic NDG continues to be an equilibrium of NDG(q) for this range of q. At q = 11
15, there is a
sudden change, as chilling–effect equilibria appear and, beyond this point, the outcome (5.50, 4.50) is no longer an






, the set of agreement equilibria shrinks quickly, as demanding the maximum becomes
more attractive for the favoured player than the most equitable agreements, and for the unfavoured player, more
attractive than the most inequitable agreements. At q = 5
6, there is another sudden change, as agreement equilibria
cease to exist beyond this point; only the chilling–effect equilibria are left.
2.3 Treatments and hypotheses
In theexperiment, weusea totalofsixversionsofNDG(q), withq = 0, 0.5, 0.7,0.8, 0.9 and 1.0. Figure2 showsthat
fortheﬁrst threevaluesofq,onlyagreement equilibriaexist;forthelasttwo,onlyachillingeffect equilibriumexists;
and for q = 0.8, both kinds of equilibrium exist. Some equilibrium features of the NDG(q) with these particular
values of q are summarised in Table 1. As noted already, in the cases of q = 0, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.8, a continuumof Nash
Table 1: Theoretical predictions for the versions of NDG(q) used in the experiment, to 2 decimal places
Value Equilibrium Equilibriumdemands (£) Equilibriumpayoffs (£) Agreement
of q Favoured player Unfavoured player Favoured player Unfavoured player frequency
0 All [5.50, 9.50] [0.50, 4.50] [5.50, 9.50] [0.50, 4.50] 1
Risk dom. 5.50 4.50 5.50 4.50 1
0.5 All [5.50, 8.50] [1.50, 4.50] [5.50, 8.50] [1.50, 4.50] 1
Risk dom. 5.50 4.50 5.50 4.50 1
0.7 All [5.50, 7.58] [2.42, 4.50] [5.50, 7.58] [2.42, 4.50] 1
Risk dom. 5.50 4.50 5.50 4.50 1
0.8 All [6.33, 7.00] or 9.50 [3.00, 3.67] or 4.50 [6.33, 7.00] or 6.00 [3.00, 3.67] or 2.00 1 or 0
Risk dom. 9.50 4.50 6.00 2.00 0
0.9 (Unique) 9.50 4.50 6.75 2.25 0
1.0 (Unique) 9.50 4.50 7.50 2.50 0
equilibria exist, making sharp predictions difﬁcult without the use of additional assumptions. In order to overcome
this difﬁculty, we also consider the implications arising from additionally imposing the selection criterion of risk
dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988); in all four of these versions of NDG(q), this leads to a unique prediction.
7For q = 0, 0.5 and 0.7, risk dominance implies the most equitable efﬁcient outcome, with agreement occurring with
probability one, and with demands (and thus payoffs) of £5.50 and £4.50 by the favoured and unfavoured player
respectively. For q = 0.8, although there are agreement equilibria, the risk dominant outcome is the chilling effect
equilibrium, where both players choose their maximum demands and thus disagree with probability one; notably,
this outcome is payoff dominated by all of the agreement equilibria.12 NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) have only the
chilling effect equilibrium, so the equilibrium prediction for these games is precise.
Comparison of these predictions, based on Nash equilibrium and in some cases risk dominance, for the various
values ofq in theexperiment gives us thefollowinghypotheses,whichwill structureour analysisoftheexperimental
results.
Hypothesis 1 (within p = 0, 0.5, 0.7) There are no systematicdifferences in favoured–playerdemands,unfavoured–
player demands, favoured–player payoffs, unfavoured–player payoffs or agreement frequencies across the NDG(0),
NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) games.
Hypothesis 2 (withinp= 0.8,0.9, 1.0)Therearenosystematicdifferencesinfavoured–playerdemands,unfavoured–
player demands or agreement frequencies across the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) games.
Hypothesis 3 (within p = 0.8, 0.9, 1.0) Within the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) games, both favoured– and
unfavoured–player payoffs increase as q increases.
Hypothesis 4 (between p = 0, 0.5, 0.7 and p = 0.8, 0.9, 1.0) There are no systematic differences in unfavoured–
player demands between the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) games and the NDG(0), NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7)
games.
Hypothesis 5 (between p = 0, 0.5, 0.7 and p = 0.8, 0.9, 1.0) Favoured–playerdemands and payoffs are higher, and
unfavoured–player payoffs and agreement frequencies are lower, in the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) games
than in the NDG(0), NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) games.
3 Experimental design and procedures
Our experimental design varies the game both within–and between–subjects. All subjects became familiarised with
the experimental setting by playing ten rounds of the basic NDG (i.e., q = 0). Then, all subjects play an additional
thirty rounds of NDG(q) with one of the strictly positive values of q (0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 or 1.0). The value of q in the
second part of a given session was the same in all rounds and for all subjects in that session. Subjects also remained
in the same role (favoured or unfavoured player) in all rounds, but they were randomly re–matched in each round to
a subject in the opposite role.
The experimental sessions took place at the Scottish Experimental Economics Laboratory (SEEL) at the Uni-
versity of Aberdeen, between autumn 2010 and spring 2011. Subjects were primarily undergraduate students from
12In the case of NDG(0.8), risk dominance and Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) selection criterion have different implications. The risk
dominant equilibrium is the chilling effect equilibrium, but this is payoff–dominated by all of the agreement equilibria. Since the Harsanyi–
Selten criterion gives priority to payoff dominance over risk dominance, it will select any agreement equilibrium over the chilling effect
equilibrium. Amongst the agreement equilibria, players’ interests are perfectly opposed,so payoff dominancecarries no implication oncethe








equilibrium – which risk–dominates all of the other agreement equilibria – is
selected.
8University of Aberdeen, and were recruited using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004) from a database of people
expressing interest in participating in economics experiments. No one took part in this experiment more than once.
At the beginning of a session, subjects were seated in a single room and given written instructions for the ﬁrst
ten rounds.13 These instructions stated that the experiment would be made up of two parts and that the second half
would comprise thirty additional rounds, but additional details of the second half were not announced until after the
ﬁrst half had ended. The instructions were also read aloud to the subjects, in an attempt to make the rules of the
game common knowledge. Then, the ﬁrst round of play began. After the tenth round was completed, each subject
was given a copy of the instructions for rounds 11–40. These instructions were also read aloud, after which time
round 11 was played.
The experiment was run on networked personal computers, and was programmed using the z–Tree experiment
software package (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were asked not to communicate with other subjects except via the
computer program. No identifying information was given about opponents (in an attempt to minimise incentives for
coordinationacross rounds, reputation,and other repeated game effects). Also, in order to minimisedemand effects,
we referred to a subject’s opponent as “the other player” or “the player paired with you” which, while sometimes
cumbersome–sounding,avoids the negative framing of “opponent” or the positiveframing of “partner”.
Each round of the experiment began with subjects being prompted to choose their demands (called “claims” in
the experiment). Demands were restricted to be whole–number multiples of £0.01, between zero and the subject’s
maximum allowabledemand (£4.50 or £9.50); bothown and opponentmaximum allowabledemands were displayed
on the computer screen at this time. After all subjects had entered their demands, the round ended and they received
feedback. In rounds 1–10 (when subjects played the basic NDG), feedback comprised the subject’s own demand,
theopponentdemand, whetheragreement was reached, own payoff and opponentpayoff. In rounds 11–40,feedback
includedall of theseand in thecase of disagreement,whetherthe subject,theopponentorneitherwas chosen to have
his/her demand implemented. After viewing these results and clicking a button to continue, the next round began.
At the end of the fortieth round, the experimental session ended and subjects were paid, privately and individ-
ually. For each subject, one round from rounds 1–10 and three from rounds 11–40 were randomly chosen, and the
subject was paid the sum of his/her earnings in those rounds, to the penny. Subjects’ total earnings ranged from
£4.50 to £34.00, and averaged approximately £17.85, for a session that typically lasted about 60 minutes.
4 Experimental results
A total of 264 subjects participated in the experiment (see Table 2), in 18 sessions. We will begin the discussion
of experimental results with an analysis of the aggregate data. Our hypotheses concerning these aggregates will
be tested with the use of conservative non–parametric statistical tests. The unit we will use for these tests is the
“group”. Subjects in one group interacted only with other subjects in the same group, so data from any group can be
considered statisticallyindependent of data from any other group. Each experimental session, depending on its size,
comprised one or more groups; as Table 2 shows, the 18 experimental sessions comprised a total of 30 groups.
13Sample instructions and screenshots are shown in the Appendix. The remaining sets of instructions, as well as other experimental
materials and the raw data from the experiment, are available from the correspondingauthor upon request.
9Table 2: Treatment information
Value of q Rounds Groups Subjects
0 1–10 30 264
0.5 11–40 6 64
0.7 11–40 6 50
0.8 11–40 6 48
0.9 11–40 6 56
1.0 11–40 6 46
4.1 Preliminaries
Some summary data are presented in Table 3. For each version of NDG(q), the table shows ﬁve statistics: the mean
demands of both types of player (favoured and unfavoured), the mean payoffs of both types, and the frequency
of agreement. Also shown are signiﬁcance results from nonparametric tests of differences across individual cells
Table 3: Aggregate results – treatment means and signiﬁcance test results
Value of q 0 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Favoured player demand (£): 5.41a 6.04b 5.95b 7.60cd 6.88c 8.06d
Unfavoured player demand (£): 4.29a 4.36b 4.37bc 4.37abc 4.47c 4.29abc
Favoured player payoff (£): 4.76a 5.10b 5.19b 5.80c 5.78c 6.88d
Unfavoured player payoff (£): 3.85c 3.77bc 3.86bc 3.05a 3.62b 3.02a
Agreement frequency (%): 90.1d 79.0c 76.4c 39.7ab 52.3b 24.2a
Note: Within each statistic, entries with no superscripts in common are signiﬁcantly
differentat the5% level (group–leveldata,seetext for additionaldetails);superscripts
earlier in the alphabet correspond to signiﬁcantlylower values.
for each of these ﬁve variables, using group–level data, and with signiﬁcance deﬁned as a p–value of 0.05 or less.14
Thesesigniﬁcanceresultsare displayedas superscriptlettersto thetableentries; foragiven statistic,entries sharinga
superscript are not signiﬁcantlydifferent, while entries with letters earlier in the alphabet correspond to signiﬁcantly
lower values (e.g., a statisticwith a b superscript is signiﬁcantly higher than one with an a superscript, but neither is
signiﬁcantly different from one with an ab superscript.)
Before revisiting our hypotheses, we remark on a few salient features of the aggregate data that are apparent
from Table 3. First, the data show a fair amount of heterogeneity across treatments; this heterogeneity varies with
the statistic of interest, but in some cases it is particularly striking. As an example, consider the sharp decrease
14For pairwise comparisons between NDG(0.5), NDG(0.7), NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0), we use the robust rank–order test, since
no group facesmore than one of these games,making them independentsamples. For comparisonsbetweenany of these gamesandNDG(0),
we use the Wilcoxon signed–rankstest for matched samples, with data from a particular positive–q NDG group (e.g., NDG(0.9)) compared
only to the subset of NDG(0) groups that subsequently played that particular version of NDG(q) – reducing any variability that might have
been due to session effects. See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for descriptions of the nonparametric statistical tests used in this paper. Some
critical values for the robust rank–order tests performed here and elsewhereare from Feltovich (2005).
10in agreement frequencies as one moves from NDG(0) to NDG(1.0): from over 90% to less than one–quarter.15
As a second example, note that as q increases, favoured–player payoffs rise substantially, while unfavoured–player
payoffs fall. Consequently, the ratio of favoured– to unfavoured–player payoffs for low values of q (e.g., roughly
1.24 when q = 0) is comparable to 11
9 ≈ 1.22, the common prediction of the Nash and lexicographic egalitarian
bargaining solutions applied to the corresponding unstructured–bargaining setting, but for high values of q this
ratio (e.g., approximately 2.28 when q = 1) is closer to 19
9 ≈ 2.11, the ratio implied by the less equitable Kalai–
Smorodinsky solution. Indeed, nonparametric Kruskall–Wallis tests (which differ from the robust rank–order test
in that they detect differences across any number of independent samples, rather than between two samples) reject
the null hypothesis of no difference across the positive–q treatments in favoured–player demands, favoured– and
unfavoured–player payoffs and agreement frequencies (χ2
4 ≈ 20.25, 14.66, 24.89 and 19.53 respectively; p ≈
0.0055 for unfavoured–playerpayoffs, p < 0.001 for the other three), though no signiﬁcant differences are found in
unfavoured–playerdemands (χ2
4 ≈ 5.50, p ≈ 0.24).
Second, separate from the success or failure of our hypotheses,all of which are of a qualitativenature (involving
the direction of an effect, but not its size), the point predictions of Nash equilibrium (see Table 1) have, at best,
equivocal success in characterising subject behaviour. In some cases, these point predictions fare well; for example,
average unfavoured–playerdemands in all cells are closeto the equilibriumpointprediction of £4.50, and theranges
of predicted values for favoured–player demands and both favoured and unfavoured types’ payoffs in NDG(0),
NDG(0.5), NDG(0.7) and NDG(0.8) usually contain the corresponding observed value from the experiment. How-
ever, these three statistics in NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0), and agreement frequencies in all cells except NDG(0.8), are
far away from their corresponding point predictions.
In orderto shed somelighton themixed success ofequilibriumpointpredictions,Figure3 displaystheoutcomes
from each individualpair of bargainers in all cells, from all rounds after the ﬁrst ﬁve using that value of q (i.e., from
rounds 6–10 for NDG(0) and rounds 16–40 for the other games). Each outcome is completely characterised by the
corresponding favoured– and unfavoured–player demands, shown on the horizontal and vertical axis respectively.
For each pair of demands, the ﬁgure shows a circle with radius proportional to the number of times that pair of
demands occurred in that cell.
As the ﬁgure shows, there is typically substantial heterogeneity within cells as well as across them. Also, coor-
dination on any division of the cake other than (5.5, 4.5) is extremely rare. In NDG(0), the agreement equilibrium
(5.5, 4.5) is by far the most frequent outcome, while in the other cells, (5.5, 4.5) is one of two modes, along with the
chilling–effect outcome (9.5, 4.5). This is true in NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7), where there exist agreement equilibria
but no chilling–effect equilibrium; in NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0), where there is a chilling–effect equilibrium but no
agreement equilibria; and in NDG(0.8), where both types of equilibrium exist, but (5.5, 4.5) is not an equilibrium.
The substantial amount of non–equilibrium play in all cells except NDG(0) provides an explanation for the mixed
success oftheoreticalpointpredictionsto characteriseplay at theaggregatelevel, alongwith showingthat thisability
is also limited at the individuallevel.
4.2 Aggregate–level treatment effects
We next move to a comparison between the experimental data and the hypotheses from Section 2.3. The pairwise
test results shown in Table 3 evidence general, but not complete, agreement with our hypotheses. Concerning
15Unsurprisingly, as agreementsbecome less common, the chilling effect is observed more often. The frequency of (9.50, 4.50) outcomes
tends to rise with q, from 0.1% of all outcomes when q = 0 and 8.2% and 8.8% for q = 0.5 and q = 0.7 (where there is no chilling–effect
equilibrium) to 38.3% when q = 0.8, 22.7% when q = 0.9 and 60.2% when q = 1.
11Figure 3: All pairs of favoured– and unfavoured–player demands (in £), rounds 6–10 for NDG(0) and

















































































































































































































































































































Hypothesis 1, we see that although there are no signiﬁcant differences at all between NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7),
there are signiﬁcant differences between these two cells and NDG(0) for four of the ﬁve statistics we examine:
favoured–player demands and payoffs are higher, and unfavoured–player demands and agreement frequencies are
lower, in NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) than in NDG(0). The similarity between NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) is consistent
with Hypothesis 1, though we should point out that here and elsewhere, failure to reject a null hypothesis of no
difference is only weak evidence that there actually is no difference, and as always, we should be careful in drawing
conclusions based on such results. By contrast, the observed differences between NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) on the
one hand, and NDG(0) on the other hand, are at odds with Hypothesis 1.
Result 1 We ﬁnd no differences in behaviour between NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7), but we ﬁnd higher favoured–
player demands and payoffs, and lower unfavoured–player demands and agreement frequencies, in NDG(0.5) and
NDG(0.7) than in NDG(0).
Concerning Hypothesis 2, Table 3 shows no signiﬁcant pairwise differences in unfavoured–player demands
across NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0), and no signiﬁcant differences in either favoured–player demands or
agreement frequencies between NDG(0.8) and either NDG(0.9) or NDG(1.0), though there are signiﬁcant differ-
ences in these two statistics between NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0). Kruskall–Wallis tests for differences across all three
12of these cells are negative in the case of unfavoured–player demands (χ2
2 ≈ 2.25, p ≈ 0.325) and only weakly
positive for the other two statistics (χ2
2 ≈ 5.30, p ≈ 0.071 for favoured–player demands; χ2
2 ≈ 5.80, p ≈ 0.055 for
agreement frequencies).
Result 2 Weﬁndno systematicdifferencesinagreementfrequenciesorineithertype’s demandacrosstheNDG(0.8),
NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) games, though some pairwise differences do exist between NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0).
Concerning Hypothesis 3, Table 3 shows some signs of the expected relationship (increasing with q) in the
case of favoured–player payoffs; while there is no signiﬁcant difference between NDG(0.8) and NDG(0.9), they
are signiﬁcantly higher in NDG(1.0) than in either of the other two. A non–parametric Jonckheere test (similar
to the Kruskall–Wallis test, but with a directional alternative hypothesis) ﬁnds that the increase in favoured–player
payoffs with q is signiﬁcant (J = 88, p < 0.005). On the other hand, another Jonckheere test fails to reject the null
hypothesis that unfavoured–player payoffs do not increase with q (J = 57, p > 0.1). Examination of the pairwise
tests in Table 3 suggests the reason: while there is no signiﬁcant difference between NDG(0.8) and NDG(1.0),
unfavoured–playerpayoffs are signﬁcantly higher in NDG(0.9) than in either of the other two cells.
Result 3 We ﬁnd that favoured–player payoffs increase with q across the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0)
games, but we do not ﬁnd systematic differences in unfavoured–playerpayoffs across these games.
Since Hypotheses 4 and 5 involve comparisons between NDG(0), NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) on one hand, and
NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) on the other, we make these comparisons transparent by pooling data when
appropriate. We cannot pool NDG(0) with any other cell, since the NDG(0) data are not independent of the data
from any of the other cells. However, we can pool the NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) data, and also the NDG(0.8),
NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) data. Table 4 shows the same statistics as Table 3, but with pooled data used where
possible.16 The table also shows the results of non–parametric tests of differences between the pooled NDG(0.8),
Table 4: Aggregate results– means from NDG(0) treatment, pooledNDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) treatments and pooled
NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) treatments
Value(s) of q Signiﬁcance of differences
0 0.5–0.7 0.8–1.0 0 vs. 0.8–1.0 0.5–0.7 vs. 0.8–1.0
Favoured player demand (£): 5.41 6.00 7.47 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Unfavoured player demand (£): 4.29 4.37 4.38 p > 0.1 p > 0.1
Favoured player payoff (£): 4.76 5.14 6.12 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Unfavoured player payoff (£): 3.85 3.81 3.26 p ≈ 0.0014 p < 0.001
Agreement frequency (%): 90.1 77.8 39.6 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Note: Signiﬁcance assessed via non–parametric tests using group–level data and two–tailed
rejection regions (see text for details).
NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells and either the NDG(0) cell or the pooled NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) cells.
16Obviously, pooling data from different cells can pose problems when the cells are heterogeneous. In this case, however, any such
heterogeneitywill increasethe variation within–sample, making statistical tests less signiﬁcantthan they wouldotherwise have been. In other
words, heterogeneity here simply makes our tests more conservative, so any signiﬁcant result is at least as informative as it would have been
without the heterogeneity.
13Concerning Hypothesis 4, Table 4 shows that unfavoured–player demands in the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and
NDG(1.0) cells are not signiﬁcantly different from those in the NDG(0), NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) cells. This
reinforces the implication of the Kruskall–Wallis test discussed earlier, that found no signiﬁcant difference in
unfavoured–playerdemands across cells.
Result 4 We ﬁnd no differences in unfavoured–player demands between the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0)
cells and the NDG(0), NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) cells.
Concerning Hypothesis 5, Table 4 shows strong support. Wilcoxon signed–rank tests between the NDG(0) and
the pooled NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells, and robust rank–order tests between the pooled NDG(0.5)
and NDG(0.7) cells and the pooled NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells, yield signiﬁcant differences in the
predicted direction for favoured–player demands and payoffs, for unfavoured–player payoffs and for agreement
frequencies (p < 0.01 in all cases). These differences were also apparent in Table 3, which showed a near–perfect
separation in these statistics between the NDG(0), NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) cells and the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9)
and NDG(1.0) cells (the only exception being that while unfavoured–player payoffs are lower in NDG(0.9) than in
NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7), as predicted by Hypothesis 5, the difference is not signiﬁcant).
Result 5 Favoured–playerdemands and payoffs are higher,and unfavoured–playerpayoffs and agreement frequen-
cies are lower, in the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) games than in the NDG(0), NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7)
games.
4.3 Evolution of play over time
Some more information about subject behaviour comes from Figures 4, 5 and 6. Figure 4 shows the round–by–
round time paths of favoured and unfavoured players’ demands for each game, and Figures 5 and 6 do the same for
favoured and unfavoured players’ payoffs and agreement frequencies, respectively. The ﬁgures show that over the
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14ﬁrst ten rounds (when all subjects play NDG(0)), behaviour converges approximately to the 55–45 split implied by
riskdominanceand otherequilibriumselectioncriteria(and assumed in someofourhypotheses). Averagefavoured–
playerdemands start and remain near £5.50, and average unfavoured–playerdemands, whilebeginningbelow£4.00,
rise over time toward £4.50. Despite average favoured–player demands staying roughly constant and unfavoured–
player demands rising, agreement frequencies also rise, due to decreases in the variance in both types’ demands –
also leading to increases in both types’ average payoffs, toward (£5.50, £4.50).17
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The left panel of Figure 4 shows that when a positive probability of arbitration is implemented (between rounds
17The pronounced changes over time in the NDG(0) data also suggest that at least some of the signiﬁcant differences seen in Table 3
between NDG(0) and the other games might be an artefact of early–round inexperience by subjects, rather than a true treatment effect. As
some evidenceof this, we repeat the Wilcoxon tests summarised in Table 3 and Table 4, using only rounds 6–10 of the NDG(0) data instead
of rounds 1–10 so as to remove inexperienced–subject play. Based on these new tests, we ﬁnd fewer differences between NDG(0) and
either NDG(0.5) or NDG(0.7): unfavoured–player demands and favoured–player payoffs are not signiﬁcantly different, nor are differences
in unfavoured–player payoffs between NDG(0) and NDG(0.5). However, unfavoured–player payoffs in NDG(0.7) are signiﬁcantly lower
than in rounds 6–10 of NDG(0) (where differences from rounds 1–10 were insigniﬁcant), and we continue to ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in
favoured–player demands and agreement frequencies between rounds 6–10 of NDG(0) and either NDG(0.5) or NDG(0.7), as we did when
rounds 1–10 were considered. Pooling NDG(0.5) and NDG)0.7) yields similar results: no signiﬁcant differences (p > 0.10) from rounds
6–10 of NDG(0) in unfavoured–playerdemands or favoured–player payoffs, a marginally signiﬁcant difference (p ≈ 0.055) in unfavoured–
player payoffs, and signiﬁcant differences (p < 0.001) in favoured–player demands and agreement frequencies. Thus, we continue to ﬁnd
only equivocal support for Hypothesis1 when we restrict considerationto rounds 6–10of NDG(0); there are fewer, but still some, signiﬁcant
differences with NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7).
On the otherhand, usingonlythe last ﬁveroundsof NDG(0) for comparisonswith NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) andNDG(1.0) doesnot materially
alter Results 4 and 5. Differences in unfavoured–playerdemands are insigniﬁcant in two of the three cases (p > 0.10 between NDG(0) and
either NDG(0.8) or NDG(0.9), p ≈ 0.031 between NDG(0) and NDG(1.0)), while differences in favoured–player demands, both types’
payoffs and agreement frequencies continue to be signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better in all cases. Pooling the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and
NDG(1.0) cells yields similar results: marginally signiﬁcant differences from rounds 6–10 of NDG(0) in unfavoured–player demands (p ≈
0.076), and signiﬁcant differences in the other four statistics (p < 0.001). All of the differences between the NDG(0) cell and the NDG(0.8),
NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells have the same signs irrespective of whether rounds 1–10 or rounds 6–10 are used.
1510 and11), mean favoured–playerdemands immediatelyriseby £0.70–1.95,dependingonthetreatment (an increase
on the order of 25%, on average), as subjects in this role apparently attempt to take advantage of their perceived
increase in bargaining power. In NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7), this increase is followed by a slow decline, reﬂecting
the continued existence of (5.5, 4.5) as an equilibrium, and suggesting its robustness as a focal point (as evidenced
by the right panel of this ﬁgure, where unfavoured–player demands are, at least on average, nearly unaffected by
introducing a positive q). By the last ten rounds, favoured–player demands in these two games fall back to between
£5.50–6.00 – nearly where they were in NDG(0) – though there are signs of some sort of endgame effect in the last
few rounds of NDG(0.5). By contrast, favoured–player demands in NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) continue
rising over time (though more slowly in NDG(0.9) than in the other two cells), averaging more than £7 over the
last twenty rounds, and in the case of NDG(1.0), more than £8. While these amounts are still far from the Nash
equilibriumpoint prediction of £9.50, the movement away from the non–equilibrium(5.5, 4.5) outcome is clear.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the time paths of agreement frequencies, shown in Figure 6. Here, we



























































































see that from near–certain agreement in the last few rounds of NDG(0), there is a precipitous drop, to between 30%
and 70% depending on q, when the possibility of arbitration is introduced. These drops reﬂect (as noted above)
initial attempts by favoured players in each of these treatments to take advantage of their perceived improvement in
bargaining position by raising demands, while unfavoured players do not notably decrease their own demands. As
the sessions progress, the agreement frequencies further diverge across cells. In NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7), favoured
players are largely unsuccessful in their attempts to exploit their (seeming) improved bargaining power, and agree-
ment frequencies slowly rebound as favoured players lower their demands back toward £5.50. This does not happen
in the treatments with larger q. In NDG(0.9), agreement frequencies stay at roughly one–half; in NDG(0.8), they
continuedeclining to approximately30%; and in NDG(1.0)they fall even further, averaging below 20% over the last
twenty rounds. As with favoured–player demands, while these levels are far from the equilibrium point prediction
(zero agreement frequency), they are substantially below the corresponding frequencies in the NDG(0), NDG(0.5)
and NDG(0.7) cells, consistent with the qualitative prediction of the theory.
4.4 Parametric statistics
We continue our examination of the experimental data with the use of parametric methods, in order to disentangle
the effects of the various factors that could inﬂuence outcomes in our NDG(q) games. We consider three dependent
16variables: subject demands and subject payoffs (both as fractions of the cake) and agreement frequencies. For
demands and payoffs, we estimate Tobit models on the individual–level data with zero as the left endpoint and the
maximum allowable demand as the right endpoint; for agreement frequencies, we estimate probit models on the
pair–level data. For each dependent variable, there are two sets of explanatory variables: a restricted set which does
not allow for heterogeneity between the NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) cells or amongst the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and
NDG(1.0) cells, and an unrestricted set which does. (These correspond approximately to our use above of pooled
data versus data from individual cells.) Thus, right–hand–side variables in the restricted set included an indicator
for q ∈ {0.5,0.7} (which we name “q57”) and one for q ∈ {0.8,0.9,1.0} (called “p8910”), and for the equations
with demands and payoffs (but not agreements) on the left–hand side, additional indicators for the favoured player
and the products of the favoured–player indicator with either the q57 indicator or the q8910 indicator. By contrast,
the unrestricted set had indicators q5,...,q10 for each individual cell except for NDG(0) – and for the equations
with demands and payoffs, the favoured–player indicator and its product with each of the individual–cell indicators
– as explanatory variables. Finally, a constant term and a variable for the round number were in all six sets of
right–hand–sidevariables.
All ofthe models were estimated usingStata (version 11.2), and incorporated individual–subjectrandom effects.
Table 5 presents themain resultsof theseregressions: coefﬁcient estimates and bootstrappedstandarderrors for each
variable, and log likelihoods for each model. Reassuringly, we can see immediately that for each right–hand–side
variable appearing in both models with a given left–hand–side variable, its coefﬁcient estimate differs only slightly
between the two models; this suggests our results are at least minimally robust.
Further results from these regressions are displayed in Table 6. The top and middle portions of the table show
estimated values, standard errors and signiﬁcance levels for certain linear combinations of variables. The bottom
portion of the table shows p–values for additional hypothesis tests. The variable combinations and hypothesis tests
were chosen for their relevance to the hypotheses that were listed in Section 2.3. For example, consider the models
(1 and 2) with demand as the dependent variable. While the sign of the coefﬁcient of q57 in Table 5 (i.e., βq57) can
be interpreted as the sign of the incremental effect of shifting from the NDG(0) cell to the pooled NDG(0.5) and
NDG(0.7) cells on unfavoured–player demands, the combination βq57 + βq57·favoured (in Table 6) gives the sign of
the effect of the same shift on favoured–player demands. Similarly, the combinations βq8910 − βq57 and (βq8910 +
βq8910·favoured) − (βq57 + βq57·favoured) give us the signs of the effects of shifting from the pooled NDG(0.5)
and NDG(0.7) cells to the pooled NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells on unfavoured– and favoured–player
demands respectively. The tests of βq5 = βq7 and βq8 = βq9 = βq10 examine whether unfavoured–player demands
are different between the NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) cells and across the NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells
respectively, and the tests of βq5 +βq5·favoured = βq7 +βq7·favoured and βq8 +βq8·favoured = βq9 +βq9·favoured =
βq10 + βq10·favoured do the same for favoured players.
The regression results in these two tables give ample evidenceinconsistentwith Hypothesis1 (similar behaviour
across NDG(0), NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7)), but as before, all of the differences are between NDG(0) and the other
two cells. The signs and signiﬁcance levels of the q57 variable in Models 1 and 5 in Table 5 imply that unfavoured–
player demands are higher, and agreement frequencies are lower, in NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) than in NDG(0)
(though there is no signiﬁcant difference in unfavoured–player payoffs). Moreover, the signs and signiﬁcance levels
for βq57 +βq57·favoured in Models 1 and 3 of Table 6 imply that favoured–playerdemands and payoffs are higher in
NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) than in NDG(0). Finally, the insigniﬁcant p–values resulting from the tests of βq5 = βq7
and βq5+βq5·favoured = βq7+βq7·favoured in Table6 suggestthat thereis littledifference in any aspect ofbehaviour
between NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) – though once again, we note the danger involved in making positiveconclusions
17Table 5: Regression results – coefﬁcient estimates (bootstrapped std. errors in parentheses)
Dependentvariable Demand (as frac. of cake) Payoff (as frac. of cake) Agreement














(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.004) (0.005)


































(0.328) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
q57 · favoured –0.035 0.007
(0.022) (0.016)




q5 · favoured –0.051 0.003
(0.032) (0.020)
q7 · favoured –0.012 0.018
(0.032) (0.025)




q9 · favoured 0.027 0.143
∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.029)




N 10560 10560 10560 10560 5280 5280
|ln(L)| 967.83 1051.64 4310.26 4269.66 2115.91 2100.67
* (**,***): Coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% (1%, 0.1%) level.
based on failure to reject null hypotheses.
Some of the results in Table 6 are relevant to Hypothesis 2 (similar behaviour across NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9)
and NDG(1.0)). While the p–value for the test of βq8 = βq9 = βq10 in Model 2 is (barely) insigniﬁcant, and
the one in Model 6 is only weakly signiﬁcant – suggesting only minor differences in unfavoured–player demands
and agreement frequencies across NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0)) – the strongly signiﬁcant result of the test
of βq8 + βq8·favoured = βq9 + βq9·favoured = βq10 + βq10·favoured in Model 2 implies signiﬁcant differences in
favoured–player demands across these treatments, in contrast to Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, the signiﬁcant
18Table 6: Additional regression results – compound effects and hypothesis tests based on models from Table 5
Variable combination/ Demand (as frac. of cake) Payoff (as frac. of cake) Agreement
Hypothesis Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
βq57 + βq57·favoured 0.043∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.013) (0.008)
βq8910 + βq8910·favoured 0.225∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017)
βq8910 − βq57 –0.010 −0.139∗∗∗ −1.441∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.022) (0.192)
(βq8910 + βq8910·favoured)− 0.182∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(βq57 + βq57·favoured) (0.025) (0.016)
βq5 + βq5·favoured 0.034 0.019∗
(0.018) (0.008)
βq7 + βq7·favoured 0.053∗ 0.030∗
(0.023) (0.013)
βq8 + βq8·favoured 0.233∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.030)
βq9 + βq9·favoured 0.150∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.016)
βq10 + βq10·favoured 0.311∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.025)
βq5 = βq7 p ≈ 0.50 p ≈ 0.89 p ≈ 0.14
βq8 = βq9 = βq10 p ≈ 0.13 p < 0.001 p ≈ 0.059
βq5 + βq5·favoured = βq7 + βq7·favoured p ≈ 0.45 p ≈ 0.32
βq8 + βq8·favoured = βq9 + βq9·favoured
= βq10 + βq10·favoured p ≈ 0.004 p < 0.001
Note: For variable combinations, point estimates and standard deviations are reported, along with signiﬁcance levels (*, **,
***: signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5%, 1%, 0.1% level) for test of difference from zero. For hypothesis tests, only
p–values are reported.
results for these tests in Model 4 means that favoured–player payoffs vary signiﬁcantly across these treatments,
consistent with Hypothesis 3.
There is mixed support for our Hypothesis 4. The fact that in Model 1, the estimate of βq8910 − βq57 is not
signiﬁcantlydifferentfromzero suggestsnodifferenceinunfavoured–playerdemands betweenthepooledNDG(0.5)
and NDG(0.7) cells and the pooled NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells. However, the signiﬁcant positive
coefﬁcient estimate for q8910 in the same model, seen in Table 5, indicates signiﬁcantly higher unfavoured–player
demands in NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) than in NDG(0).
The support for Hypothesis 5 is even stronger here than in the aggregate data. The signiﬁcant negative co-
efﬁcient estimates for q8910 in Models 3 and 5 (Table 5) imply lower unfavoured–player payoffs and agreement
frequencies in the pooled NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells than in NDG(0). Similarly, the negative and
signiﬁcant values for βq8910 − βq57 in these models (Table 6) indicate that lower unfavoured–player payoffs and
agreement frequencies are also lower in the pooled NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells than in the pooled
NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7) cells. Finally, the positive and signiﬁcant estimates for βq8910 + βq8910·favoured and
19(βq8910+βq8910·favoured)−(βq57 +βq57·favoured) in Model 1 imply higher favoured–playerdemands in the pooled
NDG(0.8), NDG(0.9) and NDG(1.0) cells than in (respectively) NDG(0) and the pooled NDG(0.5) and NDG(0.7)
cells, while the analogous results for Model 3 imply the same about favoured–player payoffs.
5 Discussion
The Nash demand game (NDG) has long been used as a model of how two–party bargaining occurs. The game
has two disadvantageous features, however. First, almost all variations of the game have a large number of Nash
equilibria, lessening its value as a source of predictions. Second, only two outcomes are possible: immediate
agreement or immediate disagreement, with no opportunity for renegotiation. Anbarci and Boyd (2011) proposed a
modiﬁcation of the standard NDG, under which incompatibledemands – rather than leading to certain disagreement
– only lead to disagreement with probability1−q. With theremaining probabilityq, thebargainers go to arbitration,
with one of them randomly chosen to receive his/her demand and the other receiving the remainder.
Our paper conducts an experimental examination of this “NDG with random arbitration”. We begin with a
bargainingsettingin which oneplayer is favoured relativeto the other, and wevary therandom arbitrationparameter
q. We show theoretically that as q increases, the set of “agreement equilibria” (Nash equilibria in which agreement
is reached) weakly shrinks. Beyond a thresholdvalueof q, there also exists a “chilling–effect”equilibriumwith both
players demanding their maximum amount (and thus not reaching agreement); beyond an even higher higher value
of q, this is the only Nash equilibrium.
As is often the case, our experimental data provide (at best) mixed support for standard game–theoretic point
predictions. However, we ﬁnd fairly strong support for the theory’s directional predictions, both with conservative
non–parametricstatisticaltestsand withstandardregressiontechniques. Firstly,weﬁnd starkdecreases in agreement
frequencies as q increases, consistent with the rising prominence of the chilling–effect equilibrium in comparison
with the set of agreement equilibria.
Secondly, we ﬁnd that raising q tends to reinforce the asymmetry of the underlying bargaining setting, increas-
ingly beneﬁting the favoured player at the expense of the unfavoured player. On average, we ﬁnd that the ratio of
favoured– to unfavoured–player payoffs increases with q, from being roughly comparable to the ratio implied by
the lexicographicegalitarian outcome (the most equitableefﬁcient outcome) at the lowest values of q to being about
the same as that implied by the more unequal Kalai–Smorodinsky outcome at the highest values of q. This distribu-
tional aspect of random arbitration – and in particular, the possibilitythat bargainers may have almost diametrically
opposed preferences over the size of q – may be an important topic for further research.
Finally, consistent with the theory, we ﬁnd that increases in q yield non–uniformeffects on observed bargaining
outcomes. For fairly substantial ranges within the unit interval – from 0 to 0.7, and again from 0.8 to 1.0, changes
to q are observed to have minimal effect on either the likelihood of agreement or the distribution of the surplus
given that agreement is reached. But moving from q = 0.7 to q = 0.8 is associated with sharp changes in results,
consistent with the implication of risk dominant Nash equilibrium.
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22A     Sample instructions and screenshots 
Below is the text of instructions from our cell with q = 0 in rounds 1-10 (given out before round 
1) and q = 0.8 in rounds 11-40 (given out between rounds 10 and 11), followed by two sample 
screenshots (the decision screen and the end-of-round feedback screen). The other sets of 
instructions are the same except for where the value of q is mentioned; these are available from 
the corresponding author upon request. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instructions: first part of experiment  
You are about to participate in a decision making experiment. Please read these instructions 
carefully, as the money you earn may depend on how well you understand them. If you have a 
question at any time, please feel free to ask the experimenter. We ask that you not talk with the 
other participants during the experiment.  
This experiment consists of two parts. These instructions are for the first part, which will be 
made up of 10 rounds. The second part will be made up of 30 rounds; you will receive 
instructions for the second part after this part has ended. Each round in this part consists of a 
simple computerised bargaining game. At the beginning of a round, you are randomly paired 
with another participant, with whom you play the game. You will not be told the identity of the 
person you are paired with in any round, nor will they be told yours – even after the session ends.  
The bargaining game is as follows. You and the person paired with you bargain over a £10.00 
prize. You and the other person make simultaneous claims for shares of this prize. The claims 
must be multiples of £0.01, and cannot be less than zero. The maximum allowable claim is 
different for the two people in a pair: for one, the maximum is £9.50, and for the other, it is 
£4.50. Your maximum allowable claim will be the same in all rounds. 
 
Your profit in a round depends on the claims made by you and the person paired with you: 
- If your claims add up to the amount of the prize or less, your profit equals your claim, and the 
other person’s profit equals his/her claim.  
- If your claims add up to more than the amount of the prize, both you and the other person 
receive a profit of zero.  
 
Sequence of Play: The sequence of play in a round is as follows.  
(1) The computer randomly pairs up the participants. Your computer screen will display your 
maximum allowable claim and that of the other person.  
(2) You choose a claim for your share of the £10.00 prize. The other person chooses a claim for 
his/her share of the prize. Your claim can be any multiple of 0.01, between zero and your 
maximum allowable claim (inclusive). Both of you choose your claim before being informed 
of the other’s claim. 
(3) The round ends. You receive the following information: your own claim, the claim made by 
the person paired with you, your own profit for the round, the profit of the person paired with 
you.  
After this, you go on to the next round.  
Payments: At the end of the experimental session, one round from this part will be chosen 
randomly for each participant. You will be paid the total of your profits in this round. In addition, 
there will be opportunities for payments in the second part of the session. Payments are made 
privately and in cash at the end of the session.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instructions: second part of experiment  
The procedure in this part of the experiment is similar to that in the first part. You will play a 
computerised bargaining game for 30 additional rounds. The participant paired with you will 
still be chosen randomly in every round, and the amount you bargain over and your maximum 
allowable claims will be the same as before.  
The difference from the first part of the experiment is that you might not receive a zero profit if 
your claim and the other person’s claim add up to more than £10.00. Specifically, the 
computer randomly determines what happens in this case. 
- There is now a 40% (8 out of 20) chance that you receive the amount you claimed, and the 
person paired with you receives the remainder (£10 minus the amount you claimed).  
- There is now a 40% (8 out of 20) chance that the person paired with you receives the amount 
he/she claimed, and you receive the remainder (£10 minus the amount he/she claimed).  
- There is now a 20% (4 out of 20) chance that both of you receive zero. 
 
As before, if your claims add up to the amount of the prize or less, you receive your claim, and 
the other person receives his/her claim.  
 
Payments: At the end of the experimental session, three rounds from this part will be chosen 
randomly for each participant. You will be paid the total of your profits in those three rounds. 
Your earnings from this part of the experiment will be added to your earnings from the 
previous part. 
 
  Decision screen: 
 
 Feedback screen: 
 